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Overview
To engage in modern commercial farming, global experience indicates that it is necessary to secure 
land tenure needed to support long term investments and growth in productivity; secure tenure is 
also needed to create vibrant land markets that can shift land and labor resources from low to higher 
productive entities. This was the case especially in China and Viet Nam following their agrarian and 
land reforms initiated in late 1970s and 1980s, respectively. Their agricultural productivity and 
incomes were enhanced through increased investments and technology, with agriculture fueling the 
rest of the economy to grow even faster sucking in more labor (Johnson 2000; Zhai, Hertel, and Wang 
2003; Deininger and Jin 2003; and Deininger and Jin 2007). Africa’s agricultural transformation 
agenda must therefore include measures to make land tenure more secure and land markets more 
fluid. While not sufficient on their own, land registration and titling are important measures to make 
land tenure systems secure and to facilitate the operation of formal land markets (Deininger and 
Feder 2009).
Land registration in Africa is still at low levels and cannot sustain transformation of Africa’s 
agriculture. While Western European countries have on average more than 95 percent of their land 
registered (Schmid and Hertel 2005), in Africa only about 10 percent of the rural land is formally 
recorded in a public register, leaving 90 percent held under customary law and practice where land 
allocation and use are governed by customary traditions; it is a mix of individualized and communal 
rights as well as open access for some lands such as range land (AU-AfDB-UNECA Land Policy 
Initiative 2015). Notwithstanding that customary tenure regime can in many instances provide 
subsistence farmers -- the vast majority of the farmers in Africa -- with the minimum tenure security 
to engage in low productive traditional agriculture, it does not provide enough security of land 
tenure to support higher productive commercial farming. The latter requires assurances that 
benefits from long term investments accrue to the farmers; and that land markets are fluid to enable 
farmers’ access to land to expand farming and to use as collateral for investment loans (Lawry et al. 
2014).
Despite low levels of land registration in Africa, recent experiences provide enough lessons to 
guide a rapid scale up across the continent. The customary tenure regime and the low level of 
documentation of land rights in Africa are embedded in the continent’s colonial history. During the 
colonial rule in Africa, the major colonial powers did not launch major national programs of 
systematic land titling and registration except where large-scale expropriation of land for white 
settlements or commercial plantations was undertaken, primarily in Kenya, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa and North Africa. Even in the post-independence era, major national programs of systematic 
documentation of land rights have only been undertaken in a few African countries, notably 
Rwanda and Ethiopia (Byamugisha 2013). But the good news is that these national land certification 
and registration programs in Rwanda and Ethiopia have been successful. They have rapidly raised 
their stock of individually owned registered land to exceed 50 percent in those countries; enhanced 
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land tenure security; and provided the required learning experiences for the rest of Africa. In 
addition to registering individually owned land, initiatives have also been made, notably in 
Mozambique and Uganda, to formalize and register communally owned land although progress has 
been limited. For this, Africa can learn from the experiences of Mexico which has had considerable 
success in registering communally owned land1. 
In addition to recent initiatives in accelerating land registration, African countries led by 
Rwanda and Mauritius have also embarked on programs to computerize land administration 
systems that enhance land market transactions. Following completion of its national land 
certification program, Rwanda has computerized her land administration systems to improve 
efficiency in land transactions including land transfers and mortgages. Mauritius also did the same. 
As a result, in 2015 it took 32 days to transfer land in Rwanda and 14 days in Mauritius compared to 
57 days for Sub-Saharan Africa and 22 days for OECD high income countries (World Bank 2015b). At 
least 25 more African countries have joined Rwanda and Mauritius to initiate computerization of 
their land administration institutions as of 2015.2 
From the reforms that have been undertaken so far in accelerating land registration and 
increasing efficiency in land administration, there are some emerging best practices that can 
inform the acceleration of reforms in Africa. These are largely based on the use of new cost-
reducing technologies. First, to accelerate the titling and registration of individually owned land 
quickly and inexpensively, a geo-referenced photomap was used by Rwanda as a base map to 
implement its national program of demarcating and certifying its land in less than 5 years at a cost of 
US$8 per parcel in a participatory manner that protected the land rights of women. The pace and 
cost of the program, which was completed in 2013, were globally impressive. Mexico used similar 
technologies to successfully register communally owned land after formalizing the communal land 
owning groups (ejidos) as legal entities from 1992 to 1999.  Second, to increase efficiency and 
transparency in land administration, Rwanda and Mauritius have used ICT technologies to 
successfully re-engineer and computerize their land administration systems which have speeded up 
land transactions and improved mortgage services through creation of electronic links with banks. 
The use of geo-referenced photomaps and related spatial technologies by Rwanda and Mexico to 
accelerate registration of individually and communally owned land and the use of ICT technologies 
by Rwanda and Mauritius to computerize their land administration systems offer best practices for 
Africa to emulate. For Africa to transform its agriculture, these and other best practices in land 
policy need to be scaled up across the continent to increase the level of security of land tenure and 
the ease with which land rights can be transferred between different entities, including individuals, 
households and firms. 
The state of land tenure and land markets in Africa
Transforming Africa’s agriculture faces at least two challenges arising from the current state of land 
tenure systems in Africa. First there is a need to increase security of land tenure to provide 
incentives for long term investments to enhance agricultural productivity and commercialize 
agriculture. Second there is also a need to increase the fluidity of land markets to provide easy and 
1 From 1992 to 1999, Mexico’s communally owned settlements called ejidos were formalized as communal land owners in a process which 
involved legally establishing ejidos as self-governance institutions and registering their communal land rights after surveying and mapping 
their land. More than 18,000 ejidos were formalized and 57 million hectares of their land mapped and registered (Byamugisha 2013).
2 They include Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Comoros, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia (World Bank 2015b)
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secure access to enterprising farmers who want to buy or lease land from farmers that are less 
efficient or want to get out of farming in search for better opportunities elsewhere.  
Africa’s land tenure insecurity is considerably reflected in high levels of land disputes. In Africa, 
disputes over land range from those over boundaries to others over ownership of entire plots of land; 
they also range from intra family or clan to inter family and clan disputes. The wide variety of 
disputes and their causes makes homogenous treatment of the subject inappropriate. It is clear, 
however, that land disputes are an increasingly prevalent feature of life in Africa exacerbated by a 
combination of low rates of land registration, unreliable land information, rising demand for 
agricultural land and weak institutions (formal and informal) in charge of land dispute resolution 
(Urmilla 2010). Land disputes render significant amount of land unusable for agriculture. For 
example, it is estimated that 6.5 percent of all of Uganda’s agricultural land parcels have disputes 
and that 5-11 percent of agricultural production is lost due to land conflicts (Deininger and 
Castagnini 2004). It is also estimated that plots of agricultural land with conflicts have 20 percent 
lower yields than those without conflicts (Mwesigye and Matsumoto 2014). 
Africa’s judicial systems are strained partly due to the high levels of land disputes. For example, in 
Ghana, it is estimated that 50 percent of all new civil cases lodged are land-related. This percentage 
increases if land-related criminal matters are taken into account (Ghana Judicial Service, 2010). In 
Ethiopia, one-third to one-half of all cases within the formal judicial system are estimated to be land-
related (Deininger, Selod and Burns 2012). Land policy actions must be taken to reduce land disputes 
in the first place and to strengthen judicial and formal institutions of land administration and their 
interface with the traditional institutions of land administration (Byamugisha 2013).
Also underlying Africa’s land tenure insecurity is poor documentation of land rights and rising 
demand for agricultural land from investors. With the exception of a few countries such as 
Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa and those in north Africa that have 
completed titling a large share of their rural land, most of Africa’s land is undocumented, informally 
administered and thus vulnerable to land grabbing and expropriation without adequate 
compensation (Byamugisha 2013). Only about 10 percent of Africa’s rural land is recorded in a public 
registry (AU-AfDB-UNECA Land Policy Initiative 2015). Not surprisingly, countries with abundance 
of uncultivated land have the least documented and formally administered land. For example 
Angola, Congo DRC, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia each has less 
than 5 percent of rural land registered and formally administered. While Africa’s informal 
arrangements for owning and administering customary land used to provide enough tenure 
security to the community residents especially for traditional agriculture (Bruce and Mighot-Adolla 
1994), population pressure, rapid urbanization and increased demand from investors, especially 
after the large price increases in food and fuel in 2008, have generated tenure insecurity and made 
urgent the need to invest in measures to secure tenure and strengthen land administration systems 
(Byamugisha 2013). The aspiration of Africa’s leaders to commercialize and transform agriculture 
makes it urgent to regularize land tenure and strengthen land administration to minimize risks on 
the part of investors while also protecting local communities and the environment from land 
dispossession and degradation, respectively.
Increasing productivity and commercializing agriculture require land markets to be fluid to 
enable easier access to land for enterprising and emerging farmers. Available evidence indicates 
that land markets exist and are active in Africa but they are limited in scope, lack transparency and 
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have high transaction costs. The existence and activity of the markets have been confirmed by a 
number of studies. A cross-country comparative study of land markets in SSA with a focus on 
eastern and southern Africa found that land markets, particularly informal land rental markets, to 
be more wide spread and active than generally believed (Holden, Otsuka and Place 2008). And 
contrary to fears that land markets could cause landlessness and ownership concentration in a few 
hands (Sjaastad 2003), the study found limited evidence to support this fear in Uganda, Kenya and 
Malawi. Instead it found that land rental markets helped improve access to land for the land poor 
and provided rental income for those with land that they could not use productively (Holden, 
Otsuka and Place 2008). The study findings that land rental markets tend to enhance efficiency and 
equity are consistent with the findings of other studies in the same region as well as in West Africa. 
For example, some studies found land rental markets to have had a long history in West Africa and 
often provided a means to access land for commercial production (such as for cocoa farming in 
Ghana) (Amanor and Diderutuah 2001). Evidence from the Republic of Sudan indicates that land 
rental markets transfer land to smaller producers (Kevane 1996). A recent study in Malawi and 
Zambia found rural land rental market participation to be strongly conditioned by land scarcity, and 
thus was higher in land-scarce Malawi than in land abundant Zambia (Chamberlin and Ricker-
Gilbert 2014). In both countries, the study found that rental markets facilitated the transfer of land 
from less-able to more-able producers although there was evidence of significant transactions costs 
which may hamper efficiency gains from the transactions. 
While the above evidence indicates that land markets exist and are found to enhance efficiency and 
equity, there are a few countries such as Ethiopia where land sales on agricultural land are banned. 
In other countries such as Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, statutory laws reinforce 
customary law in prohibiting the sale of customary land although there is an active but disguised 
sales market. There are also a few countries such as South Africa where land sales are permitted by 
statutory law but restricted through regulations such as a ban on sub-division of land especially 
under commercial farms, and these regulations have constrained access to land especially by the 
small and medium size investors (Lahiff and Li 2014). Regarding rental land markets, there are 
restrictions in place such as in Uganda where they are intended to protect tenants from high rents or 
eviction (Byamugisha 2014) and in Ethiopia where they are intended to protect smallholders from 
being dispossessed (Holden and Otsuka 2014) but, in both countries, they have ended up hurting the 
land-poor by reducing their access to land. Also, due to a predominance of communal ownership of 
land on one hand and restrictions on land rental markets on the other, land markets have remained 
weak. For example, according to the Uganda National Household Survey of 2005/06, due to the lack 
of clear and secure rights to land, 37 percent of agricultural land could not be sold, 34 percent could 
not be rented, and 44 percent could not be used as security for a loan (World Bank 2015a). Another 
knock back on the operations of land markets has been high transaction costs, both formal and 
informal. For example, it takes twice as long and costs twice as much to transfer land in Sub-Saharan 
Africa compared to OECD countries, even not counting the costs of paying bribes (Box 1.1). 
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The inadequacies in land markets have not supported acquisition of or rental access to enough land 
to develop medium size farms. Less productive and/or ageing farmers find it difficult to rent out or 
sell land to more productive farmers who need it to expand their farms. Women, whose land rights 
are marginalized by customary practices (Doss et al. 2015; World Bank 2011a; Bezabih and Holden 
2010; and Peterman, Behrman and Quisumbing 2010), are not adequately served by land markets to 
access land for new or expanded production to at least narrow the productivity gap with men (Box 
1.2). 
  
Partly due to weaknesses in land markets and other factors that have created difficulties for farmers 
especially women and youth to access land, the agricultural sector of many African countries is 
dominated by farms that are too small to support commercial farming. Detailed case studies 
Box 1.1: High transaction costs and lack of transparency
Even for registered land, transferring it to investors is costly and slow. It takes twice as long and 
costs twice as much to transfer land in Sub-Saharan Africa (57 days and 9% of property value) as 
in OECD countries (24 days and 4% of property value). For example, in Angola, it takes 190 days 
to transfer land.  In Nigeria (in Lagos) the cost of transferring land in 2014 was 21 percent of the 
property value ((World Bank 2014b). 
The cited statistics of transaction costs do not include the costs of paying bribes for land 
administration services which could be even higher than the formal payments. There is enough 
empirical evidence pointing at corruption being a serious issue in land administration. 
According to Transparency International’s 2013 Global Corruption report, land administration 
was the third most corrupt public service, after police and the judiciary. In this regard, one in five 
people reported that they had paid a bribe for land services (Transparency International 2013). In 
Africa, two countries -- Sierra Leone and Liberia -- were listed with Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq 
and Pakistan to have high bribery rates for land services. These rates range from 39 percent to 75 
percent. The amounts of money involved can be considerable. For example, the East African 
Bribery Index indicates that in Uganda, the average size of a bribe paid by households for land 
administration services was about US$90 (218,722 Uganda Shillings) in 2013. This represents the 
third highest amount of bribe among a total of 10 institutions (Transparency International 
Uganda 2013). In Kenya the corresponding amount was more than US$100 in 2012 (9,842 Kenyan 
Shillings) (Transparency International Kenya 2012). 
Box 1.2: Limited land rights for women and adverse impact on productivity
In Africa, with the exception of a small proportion of the continent that has matrilineal systems, 
women’s rights to land and property are very limited and often depend on their marital status. 
According to recent research, the limited access to land and other productive resources has made 
women less productive than their male counterparts, with female farmers in Tanzania, Uganda, 
Niger, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Malawi producing 6 percent, 13 percent, 19 percent, 23 percent, 24 
percent and 25 percent less than their counterpart male farmers (World Bank 2014a). FAO has 
estimated that, worldwide, if women could have the same access to productive resources such as 
fertilizer and land as men, they could raise yields on their farms by 20 to 30 percent and total 
agricultural output by 2.5 to 4 percent, and that the gains in agricultural output alone could lift 
100 to 150 million people out of hunger (FAO 2011).
6
indicate that 60 percent of farms in Ghana are less than 1.2 hectares and 85 percent are less than 2 
hectares (Owusu-Baah, 2012). In Uganda, 58 percent of farms are less than 1 hectare (Byamugisha 
2014), which is the minimum required to commercialize and move out of poverty in Uganda (Zorya 
et al. 2011).  In Zambia, 50 percent of farms are less than 2 hectares, the minimum needed to 
commercialize and move out of poverty. (Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert 2014). 
There is therefore a need for action not only to develop land markets but also to make existing land 
markets work more efficiently and transparently. In addition and given imperfections in land and 
other markets especially for credit in Africa (Besley 1994), there is a need for government 
intervention to make up for the short comings in markets to ease access to land by all types of 
farmers including women and youth. In about 40 African countries that are land-constrained or 
close to using up their arable land area (Box 1.3), policy action is needed to move land to users or uses 
that are more productive and can move farming from subsistence to commercial agriculture while 
also enabling less skilled farmers to explore off-farm economic opportunities if and when they are 
available. In land-abundant countries or in those with high land ownership concentration (Box 1.3), 
policy action is required to improve the effectiveness of markets to enable full utilization of 
underused and unused land especially by investors. 
 
  Box1.3: Land-constrained, land-abundant and land ownership inequality in Africa
Land-constrained and land abundant countries. Researchers have estimated that about 40 
African countries are either land constrained (with population per square km of agricultural 
land greater than 100 people) or close to approaching the full extent of the arable land area, with 
countries such as Rwanda, Malawi and Burundi being among the most land-constrained (Jayne, 
Chamberlin and Headey 2014). The land constrained African countries had an average of 1.23 
hectares per farm holding during 2005-2010, a similar size as South Asia which is globally known 
to be a land-scarce continent, while the land-abundant African countries had an average of 2.82 
hectares per farm holding during the same period (Headey and Jayne 2014). The land abundant 
countries (with population per square km of agricultural land less than 100) are just over 10 
including Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Senegal, 
Tanzania and Zambia (Jayne, Chamberlin and Headey 2014).
Land ownership inequality countries.  Rural land ownership inequality and landlessness are 
high in countries with former colonial settlements including Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), Kenya, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Algeria and Tunisia, and growing elsewhere.  Inequality in land ownership is at 
unacceptable levels in many African countries, quantified with a Gini coefficient of 0.53 for the 
land-abundant African countries – the same Gini coefficient as for South Asia farm holdings 
(Headey and Jayne 2014).  Although land ownership inequality is lower in the land-constrained 
African countries, with a Gini coefficient of 0.43, overall Africa’s land ownership inequality is 
quite high and growing as evidenced by Gini coefficients rising overtime, and countries such as 
Nigeria having a Gini coefficient of 0.7 which is approaching levels of Central America (0.76) and 
South America (0.85) known to have extreme land ownership inequalities (Jayne et al. 2014).
7
Land tenure and governance reforms to transform African agriculture
(a) Securing land tenure
As already argued above, securing land tenure is necessary in both land-abundant and land-
constrained areas to promote investment and increase productivity through land expansion and 
agricultural intensification, respectively. In the land-abundant areas, most of the land is under 
customary tenure and held in common. In such cases, the immediate need is delimitation or 
demarcation of boundaries and registration of communal rights which can be more cost-effective 
and appropriate than registration of individually owned land. On the other hand, land-constrained 
and densely populated areas require low-cost community-based systematic land titling to register 
individual rights. Even after registering land, enhanced land tenure security will require the 
strengthening of formal and informal land dispute resolution institutions to resolve disputes fast 
and cheaply if and when they arise in both land-abundant and land-constrained areas.Scaling up 
registration of communal land rights and promoting land rental markets. Many African countries 
have already made legal provisions recognizing customary tenure and communal land rights 
although implementation in terms of empowering communal owners through organizing them as 
legal entities and registering their land rights has been progressing slowly (Alden Wily 2011). Once 
communal land rights are registered, the allocation and management of individual plots can be left 
to community institutions, with the option to transition to more formal systems of registering 
individual land rights as the need arises as experienced in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania (Box 
1.4). In addition, energies can be focused on the promulgation of necessary regulations and 
guidelines for long term leasing to non-community members to benefit both parties as experienced 
with the ejidos of Mexico and the traditional authorities in Ghana and Fiji (Box 1.5). 
Three key lessons learnt from the Africa experience is that: (a) demarcation of communal land 
boundaries is not merely a technical surveying exercise, but a process that requires time and 
financial resources to resolve disputes and agree on boundaries before field work begins; (b) even 
without a legal requirement for a detailed survey of boundaries, registration of communal lands can 
be a very slow process if community owners of land are not clearly defined, such as established 
traditional authorities (as in Ghana) or statutory ones (as in Tanzania), and if new formal entities 
have to be developed as in Mozambique; and (c) registration of communal land needs to be followed 
up with resources to plan for communal and individual land use within the community and to 
delineate common-property resources such as grazing land. A recent project to watch whose design 
seems to be putting all the three lessons to work is ProSAVANA in Mozambique. ProSAVANA 
supports: (i) organization of local communities into legal entities and registering their community 
land rights through a community title deed which in Portuguese is referred to as a DUAT; (ii) 
registration of land rights for smallholders within the communities through an estimated 660,000 
individual DUATs; (iii) institutionalization of the government’s district land use plans in all the 19 
districts; and (iv) strengthening government’s capacity for land administration. The proposed land 
governance activities, if well implemented, should go a long way to protecting the land rights of local 
communities. However, serious concerns have been raised by civil society movements in Japan and 
Brazil about substantial risks of land grabbing by investors. In response to the expressed concerns 
especially the ambitiousness of the vision to promote investment in large scale agriculture and the 
lack of local participation in planning and implementation, recent studies suggest that actions have 
been taken to reduce the potential risks of land grabbing through preparation of a pragmatic 
Agricultural Development Master Plan and by increasing the involvement of local communities and 
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nationals in the planning of project activities (see Box 1.6). The ultimate success of ProSAVANA 
achieving its land governance objectives will depend on close monitoring of project implementation 
to ensure that corrections are made and mitigation measures strengthened if investors do not 
comply with the principles for responsible agricultural investment.
9
  
Box 1.4: Legalizing and Registering Communal Rights in Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania
Ghana. Since 2005, the Ghanaian government has used funding from the Land Administration 
Project to demarcate, map, and register Stool/Skin lands in the names of traditional authorities, 
as was advocated in the 1999 national land policy and is in line with Ghana’s constitution (World 
Bank 2003, 2011c). Funding covered 10 areas (Anum, Asebu, Builsa, Dormaa, Ejisu, Gbawe, 
Juaben, Tamale, Tieve, and Wassa Amenfi) and started as a pilot using a mix of Total Stations and 
GPS surveying equipment; the second phase of the project is now scaling up this effort (World 
Bank 2011b). The average cost to demarcate boundaries was US$500 to US$700 per kilometer but 
this has since been reduced significantly by deploying Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
techniques using mediators to help traditional authorities to agree on boundaries before 
surveying – the most expensive part of the activity – is done. ADR was able to cut down the time 
spent in adjudicating and surveying boundaries thereby reducing the total time survey teams 
used to spend in the field; the reduction in time spent by survey teams in the field meant that less 
money was spent on their accommodation, upkeep and professional fees, thereby reducing the 
overall cost of adjudicating and surveying allodial boundaries.  
Mozambique. Mozambique’s mechanisms for dealing with and formalizing customary land 
rights are largely bound up in a legal process known as “community land delimitation.” The 
Technical Annex (to the 1997 Land Law) defines delimitation as “identification of the boundaries 
of the areas occupied by local communities including the entry of the information into the 
National Land Cadastre.” The process of delimitation clearly identifies both the community and 
the boundaries of the land it holds based on “sketch maps” unlike Ghana and Tanzania which 
require a more costly detailed survey of boundaries; the “sketch maps” and boundaries are 
agreed upon with neighboring communities. As of early 2010, only 231 communities, 
representing less than 10 percent of Mozambican “rural communities,” had been delimited and 
given certificates, and a further 92 were in the process of doing so. The cost per unit to delimit 
and certify a community is US$2,000–US$10,000. A recent review recommended shifting away 
from the present sporadic approach and toward systematic delimitation, methodical 
strengthening of the capacities of land administration services, and careful engagement of local 
institutional actors (World Bank and FAO 2010).
Tanzania. With support from the World Bank, the process of surveying and registering village 
lands in Tanzania was accelerated in line with the Village Land Act 1999, which empowered 
village authorities to determine the use of land and allocate it to households within the villages 
and to investors from outside village communities (World Bank 2005). As of early 2012, more 
than 11,000 out of about 12,000 villages had been surveyed, of which about 7,000 had been 
registered. The average cost of surveying and registration is US$500 per village. It is expected 
that all village lands will be surveyed and registered by June 2013. 
All of the above 3 examples show that communal land rights can be formalized to empower the 
group owners to take further steps to endorse and enable the regularization of individual land 
rights within the communities thereby giving security to individual farmers within the 
communities; they also show that inter-community conflicts over land can be prevented. Further 
steps can be taken to develop institutions for long term leasing of land to non-community 
members as described in Box 1.5. 
Source: Byamugisha 2013.
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Box 1.5: Land rental markets in communally owned land: Experiences in Mexico, Ghana and Fiji
Mexico. Ejidos are communal settlements owned by beneficiaries of land reform processes in 
Mexico. These settlements were subject to an accelerated land reform process in the period from 
1992 to 1999, with this process involving the formalization of community groups as land owners; 
the establishment of community self-governance institutions; and the registration of communal 
land rights. Within a five year period, 57.2 million hectares of land were measured and mapped, 
with 2.9 million households receiving certificates to individual, common, and housing land. The 
program increased security of land access for approximately 1 million households who 
previously had few or no land rights. It also improved governance: more than 18,000 ejidos 
formalized internal bylaws through the assembly, with 90 percent electing representatives 
through a democratic process. The program provided a strong legal basis for numerous contracts 
and joint ventures between ejidos and entities from outside the communities.
Ghana. About 80 percent of Ghana’s land is held under customary tenure. This land is 
administered by traditional authorities (chiefs) who are recognized by Ghana’s Constitution as 
trustees with the authority to allocate land to their subjects for use. The traditional authorities are 
also empowered to endorse individual allocations of land for registration. As legal trustees, 
traditional authorities are also empowered to enter into long term leases with investors. In fact, 
they are the main source of land for commercial investments in agriculture in Ghana.
Fiji. About 87 percent of land in Fiji is held under customary title (native land). This land is 
owned communally by indigenous Fijians, who make about half of Fiji’s population. Fijians of 
Indian origin make up about 45 percent of the population but do not own land. However, the 
Fijians of Indian origin are the key planters of sugar cane, with this planting being conducted on 
native land leased from indigenous Fijians on 30-year renewable leases, with lease arrangements 
managed by an autonomous entity called iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB). TLTB manages land 
transactions involving other entities, including local and foreign investors.
Source: For Mexico, see Byamugisha, 2013; for Fiji, see Dodd, 2012; and for Ghana, see World 
Bank, 2011b. 
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Box 1.6:  Registering communal and individual land rights in ProSAVANA project in 
Mozambique
ProSAVANA is an agricultural development project in Mozambique funded under a 20- year 
tripartite cooperation program involving Mozambique, Japan and Brazil. The project covers 3 
Northern provinces and 19 districts within the Nacala corridor and has 3 components. The first 
component, which started in 2011 and lasts 5 years, supports research and technology transfer 
for agriculture development in the Nacala corridor while the third component is to promote 
agricultural production through pilot projects that organize farmers into groups and provide 
them with agricultural extension services. The second component that started in 2012 supports 
preparation of an Agricultural Development Master Plan for the social and economic 
development of the Nacala corridor. A draft has been prepared and is expected to be approved in 
early 2016. It proposes the creation of zones for the production of different crops with a strategy 
to integrate local producers into the same value chains as commercial investors (most of them 
from Brazil) via contract farming and cooperatives. To enhance land governance, it proposes to 
implement the FAO-led Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security as well as the Principles of Responsible Agricultural 
Investments. Detailed activities would include: (a) organizing local communities into legal 
entities, registering their community land rights and issuing them title deeds commonly known 
in Portuguese as community DUATs; (b) registering land rights for smallholders within the 
communities and issuing them an estimated 660,000 individual DUATs; (c) institutionalizing the 
government’s district land use plans in all the 19 districts to guide the identification of surplus 
unused land for leasing to commercial investors; and (d) enhancing the government’s land 
administration capacity. These land governance activities are intended to protect the land rights 
of local communities while also providing tenure security to investors. The proposed land 
governance activities, if well implemented, should go a long way to protecting the land rights of 
local communities. However, serious concerns have been raised by civil society movements in 
Japan and Brazil about risks of land grabbing by investors including Brazilian, Japanese and 
national corporations, and governments. The concerns are centered on the ambitiousness of the 
vision to promote private investment in large scale agriculture; and the alleged inadequate 
involvement of local communities and nationals in the planning of the land governance activities 
and the likelihood that they will not be adequately involved in their implementation. But the 
ProSAVANA sponsors have argued that there are adequate measures in the ProSAVANA project 
to mitigate the risks. A recent study of the ProSAVANA project has found that the contestation 
campaigns by the civil society movements have resulted in a reduction of potential risk of land 
grabbing even before implementation of the Agricultural Development Master Plan has started. 
For example, the revised draft of the Agricultural Development Master Plan is less ambitious in 
promoting private investment in large scale agriculture than the original vision of the 
ProSAVANA sponsors; the Plan provides for more participation by local communities and the 
nationals; and since the contestations, there have been greater consultations between local 
community beneficiaries and officials of the Government of Mozambique (Shankland and 
Goncalves 2016). Given the concerns that have been raised by Civil Society organizations, there is 
a need for close monitoring of the project to ensure that corrections are made and mitigation 
measures strengthened if and when investors fail to comply with the principles of responsible 
agricultural investments. 
Source: Based on Tawa, Amameishi and Noguchi 2014; Okada 2015; Shankland and Goncalves 
2016
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Box 1.7: Registration of individual land rights in Rwanda and Ethiopia
Rwanda. Rwanda embarked on a systematic land tenure regularization program, first with a 
pilot in 2008-2009 and scaling up the program in 2009-2013 using a systematic community-by-
community participatory approach undertaken in cooperation with local Land Committees. 
Low technology “general boundaries” rules and simple methods of boundary demarcation, 
applied by locally trained para-surveyors based on aerial photography and/or satellite imagery, 
were used. By December 2013, all land parcels in Rwanda, a total of 10.3 million, were 
demarcated; 8.4 million land titles were approved and printed for issuance but only 6.1 million 
land titles, representing about 60 percent of the demarcated plots, were collected by owners. The 
gap (40 percent) between the number of demarcated land parcels and the collected titles may be 
attributed to a number of factors including the absence of owners (some being outside the 
country) but also inability of some owners to pay for the land titles despite low fees being 
charged. 
The total cost of the land title regularization program was about US$60 million, of which 25% of 
the program was funded by the Government of Rwanda and the rest by development partners 
such as DFID. Of the total cost of US$60 million, $7 million (about 12%) was recovered in fees 
charged for title collection at about US$1.6 per parcel for the country except in Kigali (the capital) 
where the charges was about US$8.3 compared to the total average cost of US$8 to demarcate a 
parcel and issue the associated title deed. While, on average, the cost recovery for the program 
was 12 percent implying a total subsidy of 88 percent, the land owners in the capital Kigali paid 
the full cost while the owners outside the capital received a subsidy of about 80 percent. It should 
be noted that the average cost per title of US$8 is low given that the cost of similar exercises 
exceed US$20 in many countries (Burns 2007). Virtually, the whole country was completed in 
terms of demarcation except a few activities including: (i) registering land of grouped 
settlements in line with the new land law of 2013; and (ii) re-demarcating land, that was 
previously considered swamps, and issuing associated titles. And despite the low cost, the 
program was found to have a significant impact on investment in land improvements and in 
increased gender equity (Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2011).
Ethiopia. Since the late 1990s, Ethiopia has awarded certificates for more than 25 million parcels 
in the rural areas of country at a scale, pace, and cost-effectiveness that is impressive. Similar to 
Rwanda’s, the land certification process has been participatory but with no measurement of 
boundaries and no base map. Regional governments in the four main regions (Tigray, Amhara, 
Oromia, and SSNPR) used basically the same approach, but developed different formats for 
records and certificates. In a pragmatic approach, a two-level certification process was adopted 
by all four regional governments. First-level certification was achieved via locally elected 
committees who gathered information on land holdings, in a very short timeframe. An elected 
land use and administration committee assumed responsibility for the field work where parcels 
were publicly registered by entering all information for a village into a registry book and issuing 
an official certificate to each parcel owner. Use of unpaid community members and forgoing 
survey of land boundaries kept costs at about US $3.50 per household or about US $1 per parcel.
Despite the low cost, field evidence suggests that the process led to a number of tangible benefits, 
including reduced conflicts, empowerment of women, increased individual and community 
investment, and improved tenure security (Deininger, Ali and Alemu 2011). However, there are 
still issues with the first-level certification, such as document and register forms that are difficult 
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Scaling up systematic registration of individual land rights. More than 50 years after 
independence, only 10 percent of Africa’s land is registered. But the last 10 years have seen many 
African countries experiment with more appropriate and low-cost approaches to document land 
rights combining community participation with new remote sensing technologies for mapping; 
these countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Uganda (Byamugisha 2013). 
The more advanced and successful countries have been Rwanda and Ethiopia (see details in Box 1.7 
above).  In the 5 years ending December 2013, Rwanda managed to demarcate all land parcels in the 
country, totaling 10.3 million, and to issue 8.4 million land titles in a program which cost the country 
US$60 million. Of these, about US$7 million (about 12%) was recovered in subsidized fees for rural 
dwellers of only 1,000 Rwanda Francs (about US$1.6) per parcel compared to the total average cost of 
US$8 to demarcate a parcel and issue the associated title deed (Sagashya 2014). Since the late 1990s, 
Ethiopia has awarded land rights certificates for more than 25 million parcels in rural areas of the 
country at a lower cost of about US$ 1 per parcel. Unlike Rwanda’s, it was a simpler exercise lacking a 
survey of boundaries and arrangements to maintain land records; these deficiencies are now being 
fixed in a more complete registration program which started around 2012 and costs about US$5 per 
parcel (Bezabih, Mannberg and Siba 2014). In addition to being much cheaper than previous 
approaches which cost in excess of US$200 per parcel largely because of using costly technologies to 
measure boundaries (Byamugisha 2013), land registration in Rwanda and Ethiopia had a number of 
tangible benefits, including reduced conflicts, empowerment of women, increased individual and 
community investment in soil and water conservation measures and improved security and land 
rental market activities (Deininger, Ali and Alemu 2011; Ali, Deininger and Goldstein 2011). While a 
systematic review of land tenure security interventions found a positive and significant impact on 
investment and agricultural productivity in Africa, the investment and productivity gains were 
weak compared to those in Asia and Latin America (Lawry et al. 2014). The weaker impacts in Africa 
highlight the need to explore even lower cost approaches to register land rights in Africa and to 
pursue more aggressively complementary productivity-enhancing measures to maximize net 
returns from investing in the strengthening of land tenure security in Africa.
Strengthening formal and informal land dispute resolution. It has already been noted in this 
chapter that land disputes are prevalent in Africa and a drag on agricultural productivity. Even if 
successful acceleration of land registration is undertaken, which itself should minimize land 
disputes, there will still be a need to resolve emerging land disputes quickly and cheaply. This 
requires a multi-faceted approach. Here, we document case studies of initiatives that have been 
to maintain, a lack of emphasis on updating records, and the lack of a spatial framework. These 
issues are being addressed in the second-level certification which is going back to the first 4 
regions to supplement first level certification with the charting of boundaries on geo-referenced 
satellite imagery and orthophotos. This second level certification, whose piloting was done 
earlier, was in the last two years started in 8 woredas in each of the 4 regions, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture is working closely with the regions and donors to extend it to all woredas covered by 
the Government’s Agriculture Growth Program. While data is not available about the average 
cost of second level certification, it is likely to be about US$5 per parcel.
Source: Extracted largely from AU-AfDB-UNECA Land Policy Initiative 2015.
14
taken to address land disputes by strengthening judicial systems, particularly courts as players in 
land administration, empowering alternative fora for settling land disputes including negotiation, 
mediation, and arbitration as well as using customary and community-level dispute settlement 
mechanisms and institutions (Byamugisha 2013).
A number of initiatives have been taken in Africa to strengthen judicial institutions and operations. 
These include: (i) addressing backlogs; (ii) creating specialized tribunals; and (iii) addressing weak 
capacity and training of judges. Case backlogs, a frequently observed symptom of judicial 
dysfunction are a serious issue in Africa. For example, in Ethiopia, less than half of the land cases 
filed in lower courts is resolved at that level within one year, and 20 percent require more than five 
years to resolve (Deininger, Selod, and Burns 2012).  Ghana had a backlog of more than 35,000 land 
cases in courts in 2002. In Tanzania, the backlog was nearly 39,000 in 2007. Through the simple 
decision to hire retired judges and paying overtime for selected sitting judges to deal specifically 
with such cases, World Bank-supported land projects were able to reduce the backlog in Ghana by 
nearly 8,000 cases over two years.  In Tanzania, the backlog of land and housing tribunals was 
disposed of in two years as well (Byamugisha 2013). Clearly such an approach has limited 
significance in the long run, but when coupled with other measures, this can be an important first 
step in creating “breathing space” for implementing more substantive reforms. 
Another measure that has been tried is the creation of specialized judicial or quasi-judicial 
mechanisms dedicated solely to land issues such as land tribunals. When national judicial budgets 
are insufficient to operate standard courts, the prospects for establishing additional specialized 
bodies may appear grim. And indeed, the experiences of land tribunals established in Ghana (World 
Bank 2010) and in Tanzania (Deininger, Selod, and Burns 2012) proved this to be the case and suggest 
the need not only to provide adequate budgets but also to focus more  on procedural reforms and 
changes in institutional culture, rather than creation of specialized tribunals alone. Furthermore, the 
need for training to enhance the professional standards among judges cannot be overemphasized 
especially given the complexity of land law and the need to understand the relationship between 
statutory rules and customary norms.
Strengthening formal judicial institutions is critical. However, it would be futile to neglect 
alternative forums and approaches including customary institutions and alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanisms such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration to facilitate fair and 
accessible justice on land matters as Kenya’s National Land Policy advocates (United Republic of 
Kenya 2009). To a large extent, such provisions simply give expression to what is already happening 
on the ground – the vast majority of land disputes in Africa are already settled (or continue to fester 
unresolved) at local levels, outside of formal legal processes. But a growing emphasis on the role of 
local and community-based institutions in land administration comes at a time when in many parts 
of Africa, such institutions are themselves evolving rapidly in the face of social and economic 
pressures, and in some cases weakening. For example, a study of the potential of ADR in rural 
Ghana noted that there is considerable demand in rural communities for locally-based mechanisms, 
but not ones controlled by traditional elites or ones that necessarily abide by long-established local 
norms of justice that may increasingly be questioned or distorted (Crook 2011). Even so, expanding 
the range of options to resolve land conflicts systematically and out of court can have large benefits, 
especially for the poor and for women who otherwise are often unable to enforce their legal rights 
(Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008). 
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(b) Improving land markets and land transactions
Improving land markets. While evidence reviewed in this chapter indicates that land markets are 
widespread in Africa and are found to enhance efficiency and equity, there are some countries such 
as Ethiopia where agricultural land sales are prohibited and there are restrictions on the duration 
and extent of renting land (Holden and Otsuka 2014). There are also land rental restrictions in 
Uganda that severely limit the amount of rent paid by tenants and protect them against eviction. The 
restrictions represent a clear case where the apparent motivation to protect the poor has ended up 
hurting them instead (Byamugisha 2014).  The operations of land sales markets in Africa have also 
been constrained by restrictions. For example, there are restrictions on sales (but not rental) of 
customary land to non-community members imposed by customary law which, in some countries 
such as Ghana, are reinforced even in statutory law notwithstanding an active but disguised land 
sales market (Bugri 2012).  
 At least three sets of reforms are needed to improve land markets so as to enhance productivity and 
transform Africa’s agriculture. The first is to increase land tenure security. There is enough evidence 
that improved land rights, through introduction of long-term leases and/or certification of land 
rights, have increased land rental activities and productivity in a number of countries, including 
China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, the Dominican Republic, Rwanda and Nicaragua (Deininger and Feder, 
2009). In SSA, studies conducted in Ethiopia found that land certification programs in 1998-99 and 
2003-05 resulted in higher rental market activities (Holden, Deininger, and Ghebru 2009; and 
Deininger, Ali, and Alemu 2011). Studies in Rwanda also found land certification programs to have 
increased land rental market activities (Ali, Deininger and Duponchel 2015). Examples of how to 
undertake such reforms were discussed in the above paragraphs.
The second is to avoid or eliminate controls and restrictions on land markets. Experience in Ethiopia 
shows that where and when there were less restrictions on land rental markets, land rental activities 
went up and eased land access for the land poor and impacted significantly on productivity (Holden 
and Otsuka 2014) as they did in China (Deininger and Jin 2007). On the other hand, when and where 
restrictions were imposed or tightened, land rental activities went down with adverse impacts on 
the land poor and productivity such as in Uganda (Byamugisha 2014). 
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The third is to scale up the legalization of customary land tenure and to develop representative 
formal institutions to strengthen land tenure security and to enable formal land transactions to be 
conducted with non-community members, building on the experiences of at least ten African 
countries and others outside Africa such as in Mexico (see Box 1.8 above). 
African countries have to scale up efforts to organize traditional customary institutions into legal 
entities as Mozambique, Uganda and Liberia have been piloting to enable them enter into formal 
contracts of land transactions with non-community members as has been done successfully with the 
ejidos in Mexico (World Bank 2002; Byamugisha 2013; Knight et al. 2013). 
Improving land transactions. Freeing up land sales and rental markets may not be enough to 
ensure that land markets work efficiently. For example, we have already noted that it takes twice as 
long and costs twice as much to transfer land in Africa as in OECD countries, and that corruption is 
prevalent. There is therefore a need to ensure that the government role in enabling land transactions, 
through registration, is made more efficient. And one key intervention to increase efficiency in land 
transactions and reduce corruption is to computerize land records as a number of African countries 
including Rwanda, Uganda and Mauritius have done.  In this regard, Uganda was able to cut the 
average time to transfer property from 227 days in 2007 to 43 days in 2014. This was done by 
combining computerization and ICT applications with rehabilitation of existing manual land 
registers and other reforms, especially in cadastral surveying and property valuation (World Bank 
2014b). Even with paper-based systems, some efficiency can be gained. . For example, Burkina Faso 
was able to reduce the number of days it takes to transfer property from 182 in 2005 to 59 in 2012 by 
establishing a one-stop-shop for property issues and by eliminating the need to obtain a consent to 
the transfer from the municipality (World Bank 2013c). Similarly, Burundi reduced the number of 
Box 1.8: Legalizing and institutionalizing customary tenure in selected African countries
Since the late 1960s, at least ten African countries have passed legislations recognizing 
customary land tenure and their respective institutions or newly created ones to administer and 
enforce the land rights of people residing in their rural communities. Such a recognition of 
customary land rights and the development of formal local institutions to manage them are 
considered essential to securing Africa’s predominant land tenure system and to promoting 
efficient and equitable land transactions. This facilitates increases in investment and 
productivity and enhances the sharing of prosperity in Africa (Byamugisha 2013). The 
legislations and implementation performance of 7 of the 10 African countries, namely Botswana, 
Namibia, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa and Mauritania, have been analyzed by 
a number of researchers (USAID 2012). Legislations and implementation performance for the 
remaining three – Ghana, Kenya and Zambia – can be found in the countries’ respective 
constitutions and land laws. For Ghana and Zambia, there is legal recognition of traditional 
authorities as trustees of their people.  In Kenya, its 2010 Constitution recognizes community 
land rights and provides for a specific legislation which was being considered by Kenya’s 
Parliament in early 2016. While legislating for the integration of customary tenure into statutory 
law has made good progress, implementation has been slow except in Botswana, Namibia and 
Tanzania (USAID 2012). Notwithstanding the slow progress in implementation, the expected 
benefits in terms of increased tenure security and enabling local communities to administer their 
lands including transacting with non-community members are potentially worth the 
investment, based on the experiences of the ejidos in Mexico (World Bank 2002; and Byamugisha 
2013). 
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days to transfer property from 94 in 2011 to 23 in 2014 by establishing a one-stop-shop for property 
registration and placing strict time service standards on registration (World Bank 2014b). The lesson 
is that computerization of land records together with administrative measures to streamline work 
flows and processes can reduce the cost (in money and time) of land transactions considerably. They 
can also reduce corruption as demonstrated in the experience of India where, one of its states – 
Karnataka -- saved users of land administration services an estimated US$16 million in bribes 
annually after it computerized its land records (Deininger 2008).
(c) Easing access to land 
While strengthening land tenure security is key to achieving efficient land allocation among farmers 
both in land abundant and land-constrained areas as it facilitates land markets, additional 
interventions must be made to improve operations in land markets to make land easily accessible to 
all farming households including the land-poor, women and the youth to maximize their 
contribution to agricultural transformation.  This will entail a number of interventions. 
Strengthening land markets. First, as already discussed in the previous section, the performance 
involving land sales and rental markets must be enhanced further by addressing structural barriers 
and easing restrictions and controls. In the land abundant areas countries where customary tenure 
systems are predominant, legalization and registration of communal land rights are expected to 
create community groups that can conclude agreements with national and international investors in 
the form of long term lease contracts as traditional authorities in Ghana have been doing (Bugri 
2012). In the land-constrained countries, informal land sales and rental markets which are already 
prevalent are expected to grow even stronger if actions are taken to free up those markets. In this 
respect, the rental markets have a high potential to increase access of the land-poor, women and 
youth to land. This is because such actions are cost-effective in transferring land (Deininger 2003). 
Impact evaluation studies indicate that the establishment of land rental markets following the 
agrarian reforms in China 1978 and in Viet Nam in 1988 proved successful in easing access to land 
for the land-poor and in increasing overall productivity. In China,  the introduction of land markets 
increased agricultural productivity by about 60 percent (Deininger and Jin 2009) while in Vietnam, 
both rental and sales markets were found to have an unambiguously positive impact on productivity 
(Deininger and Jin 2003). In addition, in China land markets reduced population pressure in the 
densely populated agricultural areas by facilitating out-migration which increased the share of 
migrants in China’s labor force from 5 percent in 1988 to 17 percent in 2000, or a total of 124.6 million 
people (Zhai, Hertel, and Wang 2003, and Deininger and Jin 2007). In Viet Nam, it increased the 
incidence of migration by households from 29% in 1993 to 64% in 1998 (Deininger and Jin 2003). 
Allocating unused agricultural state land to investors and the land-poor. Given that most of the 
state-owned land in Africa is underutilized, such land would be put to better use if it were allocated 
to investors using competitive mechanisms or to the land poor in a transparent way. Ghana and 
Tanzania are some of the African countries in the process of allocating suitable state land to 
agricultural investors (SAGCOT 2011; World Bank 2012) while Kenya’s new land policy provides for 
legal recognition as owners to long term occupants of state-owned agricultural land (United 
Republic of Kenya 2010). In Malawi, unoccupied or underused state land was sold to land-poor 
farmers at subsidized prices under a community-based land reform program (World Bank 2004b; 
Tchale 2014). But as noted earlier, to undertake any of these options to allocate state land, a land 
inventory exercise has to be done first to identify and establish the ownership and occupancy status 
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of the lands and to survey and register it as Ghana has done (Ahene and Byamugisha 2014).
Redistributing to the land-poor underused private land using market-oriented approaches. In 
Southern African countries where, due to a colonial legacy, there is high land ownership inequality 
with many large farms having unused land that could be allocated to the land-poor using market-
oriented land redistribution mechanisms using willing-buyer willing-seller approaches that are 
participatory, with funding available to support both land acquisition and land development. 
Examples of such redistribution mechanisms include Brazil (World Bank 2009) and Malawi, which in 
a pilot program during 2004-2011 successfully redistributed land to 15,000 families (see Box 1.9). 
While a similar land redistribution program has been undermined in South Africa by policies that 
favor land-rich landowners such as net agricultural subsidies as opposed to taxes and ownership 
ceilings on large landholdings to induce the excessively land-rich to sell to the land-poor (Lahiff and 
Li 2014), the successful piloting in Malawi demonstrates that it can work if carefully designed and 
implemented.
 Box 1.9: Redistributing Agricultural Land in Malawi 
To address the highly unequal distribution of overcrowded arable land, which coexists with 
underutilized large-scale farms, Malawi piloted a land reform program with funding from the 
World Bank (World Bank 2004). The pilot project aimed to increase the income of about 15,000 
rural poor families using a decentralized, community-based, and voluntary approach in four 
districts. Modeled on Brazil’s market-based approach to land reform (under  implementation 
since the mid-1990s), the pilot had three key elements: (a) voluntary acquisition by communities 
of land sold by willing estate owners; (b) resettlement and on-farm development, including 
transportation of settlers, establishment of shelter, and purchase of basic inputs and advisory 
services; and (c) survey and registration of redistributed land. Land reform beneficiaries, 
organized in voluntary groups, were self-selected on the basis of predefined eligibility criteria. 
Each family received a grant of US$1,050, managed directly by beneficiaries, with up to 30 
percent for land acquisition and the rest for transportation, water, shelter, and farm development. 
Land for the project was acquired from willing sellers, the government, or private donations and 
was registered initially under group title; it is expected that individual titles will be provided to 
beneficiaries upon demand in the future. Implementation was decentralized through District 
Assembly institutions and required capacity enhancement, especially for surveying and 
registration (additional financing was approved by the World Bank in 2009). 
 
Lessons learned from the pilot were expected to guide implementation of a broader program of 
land reform initially designed in 2004, but this is currently being revised. According to the 
impact evaluation, the project achieved even better results than the Brazilian model on which it 
was based (World Bank 2009): more than 1.5 hectares of land were distributed, on average, to 
each of 15,142 rural households (40,102 households in Brazil); agricultural incomes increased an 
average of 40 percent per year for beneficiaries (compared to non-beneficiaries) between 2005–06 
and 2008–09 (6 percent in Brazil); the economic rate of return was 20 percent (13 percent in Brazil); 
and impacts on the livelihoods of beneficiaries and surrounding communities were positive, 
with improvements in landholdings, land tenure security, crop production, productivity, 
income, and food security (similar results in Brazil).
Source: Byamugisha 2013.
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Eliminating the gap between men and women in accessing land. While many African countries 
have put in place legislations recognizing gender equality, implementation has been lacking 
especially in the face of customary practices which discriminate against women. Relying on land 
markets alone has not provided women enough access to land. However, there is a number of 
countries that has made significant progress toward eliminating discrimination against women. 
The leading countries are Ethiopia and Rwanda (Box 1.10). Key interventions have involved 
providing for gender equality not only in the constitutions but also in land related laws and others 
governing marriage, divorce and succession. In addition, intensive publicity and awareness 
campaigns have been undertaken to disseminate these laws. Nation-wide programs of land tenure 
regularization and certification have also been structured and implemented in ways that ensure 
adequate representation of women.
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(d) Protecting land rights of smallholders and local communities
To develop Africa’s abundant uncultivated land which gives Africa a potential comparative 
advantage in agriculture, it is critically important to improve land tenure security and governance to 
ensure that the investments are economically, socially and environmentally viable. Large scale 
agricultural investments jointly studied by UNCTAD and World Bank found that they have 
generated positive socio-economic benefits for surrounding communities and host countries but 
Box 1.10: Land Reforms to Strengthen Women’s Land Rights in Ethiopia and Rwanda
Ethiopia. Since the 1997 Federal Proclamation (law), which devolved the responsibility for land 
policy to the regions, and the subsequent land proclamations of the main regions, both men and 
women are entitled to the same land rights. However, in practice, women’s rights to land depend 
on marriage as their rights are not registered separately, but jointly with their spouses. This has 
limited access of women to land.  This is especially the case with widows and unmarried women. 
But Ethiopia’s land certification program, implemented in its four main regions in the late 1990s 
through the mid-2000s, undertook a serious effort to strengthen women’s access rights to land. 
The program provided tenure security by issuing land use certificates to both spouses, 
conferring equity and joint ownership. A number of studies have analyzed the impact of the 
program on women farmers’ tenure security and on agricultural productivity, and found that 
women received land certificates either jointly or singly, with certificates that carried the names 
and photos of both husband and wife (Deininger, Ali, and Alemu 2011; and Bezabih and Holden 
2010). The studies found that the certification program raised land tenure security for both men 
and women farmers, but the productivity gains were mixed. While the program had an overall 
positive impact on productivity, the gains of men farmers were far greater than those of women 
farmers. This supports the widely claimed hypothesis that women farmers need better access to 
other productive inputs, such as improved seed and fertilizer, to maximize their gains from 
improved tenure security (Quisumbing and Pandolfelli 2008).
Rwanda. After emerging from genocide in 1994, Rwanda undertook considerable legal and 
institutional reforms in the land sector, followed by implementation of a nationwide land 
registration program. The National Land Policy of 2004 and the Organic Land Law of 2005 
(together with the 1999 Law Regarding Matrimonial Regimes, Liberalities and Successions) 
conferred the following: (i) equal rights to daughters and sons to inherit property belonging to 
their parents; (ii) protection of women’s property rights under legally registered marriages 
subject to the provisions of the family law; and (iii) requirements for both women and men to 
provide consent in the case of sale, mortgage, or exchange of matrimonial property by any of the 
partners (Government of Rwanda, 2005). The government used financial and technical support, 
primarily from DFID, to implement a nationwide land registration program that aimed to clarify 
existing land rights on all of the country’s 10 million land parcels (Sagashya 2014). An impact 
study analyzed the short-term impact of the registration program and found that the program: (i) 
improved access to land among legally married women; (ii) prompted better gender-neutral 
recording of inheritance rights; and (iii) led to increased investment and maintenance of soil 
conservation measures, particularly among female-headed households (Ali, Deininger, and 
Goldstein 2011).
Source: Byamugisha 2013.
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many have had negative impacts, the biggest being disputes over access to land such as conflict 
between formal rights given to the investor by the state and the informal rights of existing users of 
the land (World Bank 2014). Africa, is of particular interest partly because more than half of the land 
that has been claimed by investors in the last ten years has been in Africa including at least 1 million 
hectares each in Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique and Sudan between 2004 and 2009 (Deininger et al. 
2011; Cotula 2013) and, with weak land governance including 90 percent of rural land being 
undocumented, there are serious concerns about failure to recognize, protect or (where a voluntary 
transfer can be agreed upon) properly compensate local communities for their land rights 
(Deininger et al. 2011). Examples of investor land acquisitions in Africa with poor local community 
consultations and compensation have been documented for cases in Ghana (Yeboah 2014), Ethiopia 
(Keeley et al. 2014), Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (German, Schoneveld and Mwangi 2011) and 
Uganda (Atkinson and Owor 2013).
To protect land rights of African smallholders and local communities while also ensuring security 
for investors, it is important for African countries individually and collectively to undertake reforms 
that take into account global and regional guidelines on large scale land-based investments 
particularly the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment That Respect Rights, Livelihoods 
and Resources (UNCTAD, FAO, IFAD, and the World Bank Group 2010), the African Union Guiding 
Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa (African Union, African Development 
Bank and UN Economic Commission for Africa 2009), the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (FAO 
2012), and the African Union Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy (African Union, African 
Development Bank and UN Economic Commission for Africa 2009). The call for action from these 
principles and guidelines include the need to: (i) scale up legal recognition and documentation of 
rights to secure communally and individually owned land; (ii) undertake participatory land use 
planning to identify surplus land for investors; (iii) develop information systems to increase 
transparency of land deals for all stakeholders; and (iv) encourage investment models that do not 
involve land acquisition or, if they do, to ensure that there is fair and prompt compensation.
Scaling up legal recognition and documentation of customary land rights. As documented above, 
while many African countries have since the 1990s put legislations in place to recognize customary 
land rights; implementation in the way of documenting those rights has been slow especially in the 
registration of communal land rights. However, there are encouraging results from a few African 
countries that have initiated the registration of communal land rights, notably Mozambique, 
Tanzania and Ghana (Box 1.4), and even more significant results from registration of individual land 
rights in Rwanda and Ethiopia which have completed programs covering a whole country and a 
large part of the country, respectively (Box 1.7). Scaling up these registration programs across Africa 
would go a long way to protecting the land rights of smallholders and local communities as 
investors engage in developing Africa’s abundant uncultivated land in the quest for transforming 
Africa’s agriculture. ProSAVANA project in Mozambique is a good example of tripartite 
arrangements between African countries and their development partners that has committed to 
building on past experiences to scale up registration of communal and individual land rights in 
Mozambique (Box 1.6).
Undertaking participatory land use planning to identify surplus land for investors. A challenge 
to attracting investment that respects land rights of smallholders and local communities is the 
identification of surplus and environmentally suitable land for investors. This is necessary for 
22
African states to avoid some past mistakes including making commitments to investors to allocate 
them land that is already allocated, is unavailable or involves dispossession of local communities as 
was experienced in Mozambique before rural land use planning was introduced (Deininger et al. 
2011). After going through such unscrupulous experiences, Mozambique placed a six-months 
moratorium in October 2007 on the allocation of land to investors while it undertook a zoning 
process of rural land at a scale of 1:1,000,000; the zoning exercise, which was based on soil suitability 
maps and rainfall data, identified 7 million hectares of land as potentially available, with 3.78 million 
hectares suitable for agriculture, livestock and forestry (Locke and Henley 2014).  Later on, a more 
detailed zoning process was launched at a scale of 1:250,000 in provinces where there has been more 
investment interest. The zoning process involves not only better mapping but also enhanced 
capacity building underpinned by donor-supported programs such as ProSAVANA (Tawa, 
Amameishi and Noguchi 2014). Similarly, while it has faced more challenges, Tanzania has also 
committed to re-orient and speed up its village land use planning activities to identify surplus land 
for investors (G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. 2012). Other African countries could 
learn from experiences in Mozambique, Tanzania and other countries within and outside Africa to 
improve their land use planning so as to facilitate identification and allocation of suitable land for 
investors without jeopardizing the land rights of local communities (UNCTAD and World Bank 
2014).
Developing information systems to increase transparency of land deals. A recent review of 
mature agribusinesses in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia by UNCTAD and the World Bank 
focusing in particular on their approaches to social, economic and environmental responsibility 
concluded that there was an insufficient amount of publicly available information to ensure full 
transparent and accountable conduct of agricultural investment. The review therefore 
recommended that governments should publicize land applications under review or approved, 
using publication outlets including investment registry websites (UNCTAD and World Bank 2014). 
To provide such transparency requires African countries to develop information systems building 
on current initiatives such as the land information systems in Mauritius, Rwanda and Uganda (AU-
AfDB-UNECA Land Policy Initiative. 2015). These initiatives need to be scaled up by taking 
advantage of new technologies in ICT. 
Encouraging investment models that do not involve land acquisition. A key lesson for 
governments from the recent review of agribusinesses in sub-Saharan Africa and South East Asia by 
UNCTAD and the World Bank is that “business models with low land needs, such as processing 
operations, can provide important development benefits without the land issues associated with 
estate operations” (UNCTAD and World Bank 2014). In these models, local farmers and other 
members of the local community are active partners (FAO 2012). Large-scale farming is only one 
option for farming the land and small farmers may find it more profitable to retain their activity 
rather than accept a wage job. In these circumstances it may be advantageous for both smallholders 
and large-scale investors to enter into partnerships rather than an agreement involving the transfer 
of land (Deininger et al. 2011). There is growing experience with models for structuring agricultural 
investments other than large-scale plantations. A wide range of collaborative arrangements between 
investors, on the one hand, and family farmers and local communities, on the other, include diverse 
types of contract farming schemes, joint ventures, management contracts, community leases and 
new supply chain relationships or a combination of these (Cotula and Leonard 2010). No single 
model is the best possible option for smallholders in all circumstances. The adequacy of a model 
depends on the local context and on factors involving tenure, policy, culture, history and geography 
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and demography. None of the models can be described as a holistic solution to rural development. 
Each of the various options has risks and opportunities. The success of such partnerships, and the 
actual benefits to communities in general and smallholders in particular depends on the level of 
ownership, voice (governance), risk-sharing and benefit-sharing between partners.
 Among these models that provide alternatives to land acquisition, contract farming and out grower 
schemes seem to be the most established and with some successful ones that African countries can 
learn from. These include the Kilombero rice and sugar schemes in Tanzania (PLAAS 2014) and the 
contract farming and out grower oil palm schemes in Ghana (Huddleston and Atton 2007), in 
Uganda known as the BIDCO Kalangara oil palm scheme (Masaba, Liversage and Jonckheere 2014) 
and in Malaysia (Cooke, Toh and Vaz 2011). Details of a sample of the out grower oil palm schemes in 
Uganda and Ghana can be found in Box 1.11.
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Box 1.11: Out grower Oil Palm Schemes in Uganda and Ghana
Uganda. Around 2,000, the Kalangala oil palm out grower scheme was initiated as a public-
private partnership involving the Government of Uganda, Bidco Uganda Limited (BUL) and 
smallholders. The agreement was to develop 40,000 ha of oil palm plantations in subsequent 
phases, as well as a 300 ton/day refinery to produce crude palm oil. The first phase of the project, 
which is on-going involved the development of 10,000 ha of oil palm plantations on Bugala Island 
in Kalangala District, of which 6,500 ha was nucleus estate and 3,500 ha were smallholder 
plantations as out growers. Both the nucleus estate and the oil palm refinery were developed by 
BUL on land leased from the government of Uganda. The second phase, which is underway, 
intends to expand smallholder production from 3,500 hectares to 4,700 hectare while keeping the 
nucleus estate at 6,500 hectares. BUL (and its business corporate partners) also provides inputs, 
credit and transportation of oil palm to the factory for which out growers receive a guaranteed 
price for oil palm based on a long term average world market price for palm oil. Using financial 
support from IFAD, the government of Uganda funded the required transport infrastructure 
including upgrading the Kalangala district road network and establishing a ferry service to and 
from the island of Kalangala district. It also facilitated the leasing of land to BUL, the bulk of 
which was public land while the rest was private land the government acquired on a willing-
buyer willing-seller arrangement at market prices; the government leased the land to BUL for 99 
years on standard terms provided for under the Uganda Land Act. To ensure land tenure 
security for the out growers on their own land, land surveying and registration services were 
provided free by the government with support from IFAD. While this oil palm out grower 
scheme has not reached full completion, a review by IFAD has concluded that the project has 
been successful, with customer surveys indicating satisfaction from the out growers. The land 
acquisition arrangements have not adversely affected the land rights of the local community 
while, at the same time, they have provided land tenure security to the investors.
Ghana. In 1978, an out grower oil palm scheme was in initiated in central Ghana, by a tripartite 
public-private partnership involving the Government of Ghana (GoG), Twifo Oil Palm 
Plantations Limited (TOPP) and smallholder producers of oil palm. GOG provided a concession 
to TOPP including land for the nucleus estate and processing factory. The occupants of land, 
totaling 250, were resettled on a government-owned land as long term tenants and given support 
to grow oil palm as out growers under the Smallholder Tenant Scheme Project (now in phase 3) 
funded by EU and the government of Netherlands. These out growers have received technical 
assistance (including extension services) as well as inputs and transportation (for inputs and 
outputs) on credit from TOPP which deducts the costs from payment for the oil palm fruits, 
amounting to about 30 percent. In addition, the scheme co-opted other farmers who are 
supported to grow oil palm on their own land under the Buabin Oil Palm Out grower Project, 
funded by ADF. These new out growers, about 900, have received similar support from TOPP as 
the original ones; in addition, they receive support to register their land. As of July 2011, the 
scheme had about 1,000 out growers growing oil palm on 3,000 ha of land while TOPP grows its 
own oil palm on a nucleus estate of 4,234 ha.  According to evaluations of the out grower scheme, 
the land rights arrangements have generally been adequate; the challenge faced by the out 
growers is the fluctuation of world prices of palm oil on which payments to out growers is based. 
On the other hand, the challenge faced by TOPP is the side-selling of oil palm fruits by the out 
growers.
Source: For Uganda, see Masaba, Liversage and Jonckheere, 2014; Ghana, see Paglietti and Sabrie, 
2013.
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Costs and benefits of land reforms for transforming African agriculture
While no attempt has been made to quantify the costs of land reforms suggested in this chapter, they 
are considerable and in the range of US$5 billion for the African continent given that a recent 
estimate for similar reforms made by a World Bank study put the cost at US$4.5 billion for SSA which 
excludes North Africa (Byamugisha 2013). They include costs not only for land policy and 
institutional reforms but also for public investments in reforming land tenure and modernizing 
infrastructure and systems for land administration.
Though the costs of implementing the land reforms are high, the reforms are likely to produce 
considerable benefits. The primary benefits include increased agricultural productivity and 
economic growth, poverty reduction, conflict prevention and resolution, good governance and 
environmental protection (Deininger 2003; Byamugisha 2013; Deininger and Feder 2009). The 
increase in agricultural productivity would materialize through several pathways that enhance 
either investment or its productivity, including (a) more incentives for investment, especially from 
land tenure security; (b) higher productivity as land moves from less efficient to more efficient 
producers through rental and sales markets; (c) value added through land information; and (d) 
access to more and low-cost credit through the use of land as collateral in areas with access to banks 
and other financial institutions. Indeed, the impacts of interventions and associated contributions 
will vary between countries and even within a country. However, there is ample empirical evidence 
to confirm these contributions to agricultural productivity and economic growth through the 
indicated pathways, especially via investment, as evidenced in recent impact studies of land 
registration in Ethiopia and Rwanda (Deininger, Ali, and Alemu 2011; Ali, Deininger, and Goldstein 
2011; Ali, Deininger and Duponchel 2015).  
A recent comparative study of impacts of land tenure security in developing countries concluded 
that the impacts on investment and productivity in Africa were modest compared to those in Latin 
America and East Asia regions. However, these impacts were positive and significant (Lawry et al. 
2014) and, in some cases, large. For example, a study in Ethiopia found that farmers with land 
certificates were associated with an increase in agricultural productivity of as much as 45 percent 
(Holden, Deininger and Ghebru 2009). Moreover, as has been demonstrated by various studies 
especially for China and Viet Nam (Deininger and Jin 2003; Deininger and Jin 2007), the land reform 
and its growth impact on agriculture has even greater effectiveness on reducing poverty given that 
growth from agriculture is at least twice as effective in reducing poverty as growth from other 
sectors (World Bank 2007). In addition, studies show that land reforms would support economic 
development in other ways. For example, in post-conflict countries, studies on Liberia and Rwanda 
show that early interventions in reforming land tenure prevent and improve management of 
recurring conflicts associated with land and generate peace dividends (Bruce 2014). The land reforms 
are known to also improve management of common property resources, and to facilitate sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources, including agricultural land, forests, water, and minerals 
(Deininger 2003). In addition, the land reforms contribute to improved governance especially 
increased transparency and reduction in corruption (Deininger, Selod and Burns 2012). While lack of 
data and difficulties of quantifying benefits from land reform do not allow estimation of an 
aggregate figure against which to compare the costs of land reform, the qualitative assessment of the 
benefits leave no doubt that the expected benefits of the reforms would exceed the costs.
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Rising to the challenge and exploiting opportunities
(a) Challenges to reforming agricultural land tenure and land administration
While there has been increased determination on the part of African leaders to undertake necessary 
land policy reforms as reflected in a declaration adopted by African Heads of State and Government 
Summit in July 2009 in Libya (African Union, African Development Bank and UN ECA 2010), there 
are challenges reflected in the enormity of the task. These include: 
• The escalation of “land grabs” in Africa and in countries with weak land governance (Deininger 
et al. 2011; Cotula 2013);
• High vulnerability of agricultural lands in Africa (compared to other continents) to land 
grabbing and expropriation without adequate compensation as less than 10 percent is registered 
(AU-AfDB-UNECA Land Policy Initiative 2015);
• Highly inefficient land administration as it takes twice as long and costs twice as high to 
transfer land in Africa compared to OECD countries (World Bank 2014b);
• High levels of corruption and lack of transparency as documented by Transparency 
International (various issues) and in a study by FAO and Transparency International in 61 
countries (Arial, Fagan and Zimmermann 2011); and
• Low capacity and demand for professionals as indicated by Ghana, Kenya and Uganda each 
having fewer than 10 land professional surveyors per 1 million population compared to 
Malaysia with 197 and Sri Lanka with 150 (Byamugisha 2013). 
(b) Emerging opportunities to reform agricultural land tenure and land administration
The enormity of the challenges points to the need for reform effort to be much greater than in the 
past. On the positive side, there are emerging opportunities for scaling up reforms in policy and 
institutions, including:
• Emergence of better commodity prices and increased foreign direct investment with potential 
to increase agricultural yields and markets thereby raising returns to investment  in reforming 
land tenure and land administration (Byamugisha 2013);
• Availability of new technologies such as satellite and ICT with potential to reduce costs of land 
administration;
• Enforcement of basic land laws  in many African countries that recognize  customary land 
rights and gender equality which are key to improving land tenure security and equitable 
access to land (Alden Wily 2011); and
• Design and implementation  of important global and regional initiatives  including the 
Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Tenure of Land and the African Union’s Framework and 
Guidelines for Land Policy which should make it easier for African countries to design and 
implement land reforms.
(c) Overcoming political and vested interests
 
African leaders have collectively indicated commitment to undertake the necessary land policy 
reforms as reflected in the declaration adopted by African Heads of State and Government Summit 
in July 2009 in Libya (African Union, African Development Bank and UN ECA 2010) and there are 
considerable opportunities to undertake the necessary reforms. There are also other barriers to 
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overcome especially from vested interests who would oppose land reforms to preserve the status 
quo or manipulate the reforms to maximize their personal interests. These anti-reform interests 
include some African governments that have resisted reforms in the past, many large landholders 
and “land grabbers”. The anti-reform interests have in many African countries resisted the 
implementation of new constitutional and legal reforms in favor of promoting land rights for women 
because of centuries old cultural practices that militate against land ownership by women (AU-
AfDB-UNECA Land Policy Initiative 2014). Similarly at the global stage, there are many countries 
that have initiated land reforms to reduce land ownership inequalities but have been unsuccessful 
because of resistance from politically powerful land owning classes who would lose from such 
reforms (Studwell 2013; El-Ghonemy 1999).
To enhance chances of success, land reform initiators must solicit support from the wider and 
influential sections of society especially non-state actors including interest groups representing 
women, youth, poor farmers, farm workers and tenants and national and international activists in 
favor of equitable access to land; the mobilization of such pro-reform groups was done successfully 
in support of development of the 2009 Kenya National Land Policy, with the Kenya Land Alliance 
and the media playing a critical role in supporting its approval (USAID 2009-2010). In addition, land 
reforms using negotiated and win-win approaches stand a better chance to succeed in reducing land 
ownership inequalities in a democratic and peaceful environment than those using approaches that 
involve compulsory land acquisition and redistribution (Binswanger-Mkhize, Bourguignon and van 
den Brink 2009). However, as experiences of Brazil and Malawi have demonstrated, measures must 
be included to overcome shortcomings in financial and land markets including provision of grants 
or subsidized loans to the land-poor, organizing the land-poor into groups to increase their 
negotiating power in land and credit markets, and eliminating agricultural subsidies for the land-
rich while imposing progressive taxes and ownership ceilings on excessive land accumulations to 
discourage unproductive land concentration (El-Ghonemy 1999).  
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